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Introduction
Abstract
Comparative constitutional law is today an exciting and increasingly diverse field of academic inquiry in US
and Canadian law schools, as the excellent papers for this Symposium illustrate. Looking back, the 1990s were
also a dynamic period for comparative constitutional law, with a predictable emphasis on constitution drafting
in Eastern Europe and South Africa. As law and economics and empirical work became popular tools of legal
analysis, comparative constitutional law initially drifted instead toward a focus on constitutional courts and on
positive and negative liberties. Moreover, once the focus shifted away from active constitution drafting
projects, questions re-surfaced about why we should compare constitutions and, in turn, about how they
should be compared. Today, the field appears to have put this existential anxiety aside. Recent work is
methodologically diverse with a strong focus on empirical analysis. The empirical focus is complemented by
sophisticated work on informal or unwritten norms, a theme that runs through the contributions to this
Symposium. Geographic diversity is becoming somewhat less challenging—at least superficially—due in part
to a growth of resources available in English. The field is also diversifying in terms
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INTRODUCTION
INGRID B. WUERTH*
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IS TODAY an exciting and increasingly 
diverse field of academic inquiry in US and Canadian law schools, as the 
excellent papers for this Symposium illustrate. Looking back, the 1990s were also 
a dynamic period for comparative constitutional law, with a predictable emphasis 
on constitution drafting in Eastern Europe and South Africa. As law and 
economics and empirical work became popular tools of legal analysis, comparative 
constitutional law initially drifted instead toward a focus on constitutional courts 
and on positive and negative liberties. Moreover, once the focus shifted away 
from active constitution drafting projects, questions re-surfaced about why we 
should compare constitutions and, in turn, about how they should be compared. 
Today, the field appears to have put this existential anxiety aside. Recent work is 
methodologically diverse with a strong focus on empirical analysis. The empirical 
focus is complemented by sophisticated work on informal or unwritten norms, 
a theme that runs through the contributions to this Symposium. Geographic 
diversity is becoming somewhat less challenging—at least superficially—due in 
part to a growth of resources available in English. The field is also diversifying 
in terms of the topics studied, including an increasing overlap in comparative 
inquiry in private, public, and even international law. As a group, the four 
contributions to this Symposium illustrate the methodological, topical, and 
geographic diversity of the field.
The contribution by Richard Albert focuses on unwritten rules or 
“conventions” of constitutional amendment, a topic he has addressed in an 
important corpus of work on amendments and on the Canadian Constitution. In 
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this article—which is not explicitly “comparative”—he considers whether there is 
an unwritten convention that requires a national referendum in order to amend 
the basic structure of the Constitution of Canada. The primary basis for such 
a convention is the failed Charlottetown Accord, which would have changed 
the position of Quebec within the Canadian constitutional system. Although 
not required to do so, political actors submitted the Charlottetown Accord to a 
non-binding national referendum. Canadians voted down the Accord and the 
proposed amendments were dropped. Albert explores whether these events are 
merely a precedent or whether they have become an unwritten convention of 
federal referendal consultation. Applying the reasoning from Canadian cases 
and from scholars, Albert concludes that, on balance, there is not (yet) such a 
convention, although perhaps future actions by politicians will show that one 
has developed. Albert concludes with the concern that such a convention would 
make it even harder to amend the Canadian Constitution and with the suggestion 
that an alternative method of constitutional amendment be developed through 
convention. These observations provide the platform from which the Canadian 
Constitution might be compared with others.
Francesca Bignami makes a methodological contribution to the Symposium. 
Like Albert’s article, hers points to aspects of constitutionalism that are difficult 
to capture empirically. She argues that, in the post-Cold War period, convergence 
in the world’s constitutional systems (in part around democracy) has made it 
easier to compare constitutions, at least as a formal matter. But comparing the 
written terms of constitutions—what Bignami calls formalism—may overlook 
the different social and legal contexts in which those written terms actually 
function. She argues that more comparative constitutional scholarship should 
take a “functionalist” approach to comparisons by focusing on a particular social 
problem and asking how different legal systems resolve it. Empirical scholarship 
has taken the field in the opposite direction, however. As an example, the legal 
oversight of social and economic policy-making is performed in Germany by 
constitutional courts, while in France and the United States it is more often part 
of administrative law. Bignami’s contribution draws its methodology from private 
comparative law—illustrating the ways that comparative constitutional law is 
diversifying methodologically—while also illustrating the field’s topical diversity 
by addressing administrative law and regulation as an aspect of comparative 
constitutional law.
The article for this Symposium authored by Mohammad Fadel addresses 
recent constitutional change in Egypt, highlighting the (hopefully) increasingly 
diverse geographic ambit of comparative constitutional law. Fadel’s contribution 
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also underscores the importance of intellectual and religious history to the 
understanding of contemporary events—in this case, the importance of historical 
Islamic political thought to recent events in Egypt. Fadel argues that Egypt is 
witnessing not so much a battle between a secular and a theocratic society, but 
instead between conflicting kinds of theocracy. An ideal Islamic constitutional 
order requires that the state protect religious orthodoxy and its representative 
capacity. Today, however, political circumstances are such that a representative 
state undermines religious orthodoxy, creating a multiplicity of religious views. 
Traditionalists, who view historical institutions as essential to achieving the 
proper practice of Islam, may prefer orthodoxy and stability to a representative 
state, if forced to choose. The republican Islamic tradition holds, by contrast, 
that individuals may achieve religious virtue through their own study of the basic 
sources of Islam; this religious view permits religious heterodoxy, if necessary, to 
ensure a representative form of government. The latter roughly corresponds to 
the Muslim Brotherhood and the former to the architects of the 2013 military 
coup that ousted the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood. Fadel’s article 
reminds us of the continued significance of comparative constitutional law to the 
ongoing process of constitution drafting, which today has particular salience in 
North Africa and the Middle East.
In her contribution to this Symposium, Vanessa MacDonnell takes on 
“quasi-constitutional legislation,”1 a long-standing but poorly understood 
category of statutes in Canada. As in the other contributions, MacDonnell 
focuses on aspects of constitutionalism that are overlooked by comparative 
constitutional texts. Drawing on German, American, Canadian, and UK 
sources, she argues for a broad understanding of quasi-constitutional legislation, 
defining it as “legislation that implements constitutional imperatives.”2 The 
term “constitutional imperatives” means constitutional obligations of “varying 
degrees of specificity.”3 The article defends this definition against those offered 
by other scholars and against the objection that it is too broad. MacDonnell’s 
definition implies that many statutes would have quasi-constitutional status and 
that they may come into conflict with each other. She argues that courts should 
attempt to avoid conflicts through interpretation and that, to the extent possible, 
conflicts should be resolved by the political branches. The article illustrates the 
complex layers of entrenchment possible in modern constitutional systems. 
1. Vanessa MacDonnell, “A Theory of Quasi-Constitutional Legislation” 
(2016) 53:2 OHLJ 508.
2. Ibid, at 512.
3. Ibid, at 511.
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Entrenchment is often considered an essential aspect of constitutional norms, 
but as constitutional systems mature, courts and political actors tend to entrench 
norms through different means than constitutional texts and with different 
possibilities of amendment and change—a theme of Albert’s work as well. 
The field of comparative constitutional law is fortunate to have the excellent 
collection of articles brought together in this volume of the Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal.
